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Defining pro-poor growth: a response to Kakwani
In its first One Pager, the International Poverty Centre
discussed the meaning and measurement of ‘pro-poor growth’ and
came out strongly in favor of a definition proposed by its Director,
Nanak Kakwani, according to which growth is pro-poor if its rate is
higher for the poor than the non-poor; roughly speaking, if inequality
falls. This comment offers an opposing view.
Consider the example of China. Today, China’s income poverty rate is
probably slightly lower than the world’s average; in 2001, 17% of China’s
population lived below $1 a day (at 1993 PPP) compared to 21% for the
developing world as a whole. But it was a very different story around
1980. Then the incidence of poverty in China was one of the highest in
the world at 64%. Economic growth was the main proximate cause of
this rapid decline in poverty.
By Kakwani’s definition this was not pro-poor growth, but rather growth
that was biased against the poor. But it is surely hard to accept any
definition that does not identify as ‘pro-poor’ what was possibly the
most successful sustained record against poverty in recorded history.
I would argue that it makes more sense to say that growth is ‘pro-poor’
if some agreed measure of poverty falls with that growth. In other words,
‘pro-poor growth’ means growth that is deemed to benefit the poor.
If we follow common practice of measuring poverty in terms of purchasing
power over commodities, then China’s growth has unquestionably been
pro-poor. This may be considered too narrow a definition. Some people
would prefer to allow for relative deprivation, as measured by income
relative to the mean in society. This can be done by letting the poverty
line rise with mean income, although naturally growth will then have less
impact on measured poverty. My preferred definition of ‘pro-poor growth’
can thus handle relative poverty, when one thinks that people care about
their relative position as well as their absolute standard of living.
Only in the extreme case in which relative income is all that matters to
welfare will this approach give us something like Kakwani’s definition of
pro-poor growth. This would mean that an equi-proportionate increase in
all incomes was not deemed to benefit the poor or anyone else. That
position would seem so implausible in China or anywhere else as to be
rejected out-of-hand. By my definition, on the other hand, growth is
typically pro-poor in that as a rule, though certainly not always, the
incidence of poverty tends to fall with growth. This has been demonstrated
repeatedly, on better and bigger data sets, since the 1990 World
Development Report was published.
The real issue is not whether growth is pro-poor but how pro-poor it is.
One can measure this by a ‘distribution-corrected’ rate of growth, which
scales the ordinary growth rate up if the distributional change that
accompanies growth is pro-poor, or down if it is not. This shows us how
Kakwani´s and my definitions are linked: while mine focuses on the
distribution-corrected growth rate, Kakwani’s focuses solely on the
distributional correction.
The deeper challenge remains of explaining why poverty falls so much
faster in some settings than others. Again take the example of China.
Its rate of pro-poor growth in the 1990s was a hefty 4% per annum.
However, progress for the poor has been uneven over time and space
since the early 1980s. I would argue that the sectoral and geographic
composition of growth was critical. China could well have achieved
even more rapid poverty reduction if its growth process had been more
balanced. By my definition, China’s growth would then have been even
more pro-poor than it was, as poverty would have fallen faster. Thanks to
its relatively equitable allocation of land in the wake of the early reforms
to de-collectivize agriculture, China´s agrarian reforms starting in the
late 1970s were crucial for kick-starting pro-poor growth. Important too
was reduced taxation of farmers and macroeconomic stability.
More generally, the task of making growth more poverty-reducing
entails some combination of higher growth and a more pro-poor
distribution of the gains from growth. Both factors are influenced by
initial conditions, institutions and policies in specific country settings.
While there may well be trade-offs between what is good for growth and
good for distribution, it should not be presumed that this will always
be the case; some of the factors that impede growth may also prevent
the poor from fully sharing in the opportunities unleashed by growth.
None of this says that inequality is unimportant. Initial inequalities in a
number of dimensions, not just incomes, and how they evolve over time
can be crucial to the extent of poverty reduction. They can affect both
the extent of growth and how its benefits are shared. Clearly, the pace
of poverty reduction would have been even higher in China if not for
the steep rise in income inequality. Growth was definitely pro-poor in
China, but rising inequality made it less so.
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